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As the title of the book suggests, Michael Green reads Nietzsche as deeply embedded in 
Kantian and Neo-Kantian patterns of assumption and argument. The argument proceeds 
in two stages. The first stage of the argument is to show this textually by tracing many of 
Nietzsche's characteristic philosophical concerns to his early encounter with the Neo-
Kantian Afrikan Spir. Though one could argue from the same evidence that other Neo-
Kantians, e.g., Kuno Fischer and Friedrich Lange, are equally important in shaping 
Nietzsche's thought (and a thorough historical study of this sort, which to my knowledge 
has not yet been attempted, would be a welcome addition to the Nietzsche literature), 
Green's emphasis on Spir is far from misplaced, for it is from Spir that Nietzsche 
appropriated arguments against the transcendental ideality of time (along with much else 
besides), and on the basis of which Nietzsche made his first move from a kind of 
transcendental idealism to the naturalism that would characterize his thought from this 
point forward. 
 
Green also argues that naturalism, when combined with a Kantian epistemology of 
judgment, leads to the impossibility of true judgments, a position Green calls 
"noncognitivism" on an analogy with emotivist metaethical theories. To see why this is 
so, recall that for Kant, the attempt to vindicate non-empirical concepts like causality 
without providing a Lockean empirical genesis for them or taking them as brute innate 
ideas, depends upon their special relationship with the Kantian categories. The Kantian 
categories can be understood as syntactical forms (forms of judgment) which, when 
imposed upon the data of sense and the stuff of thought, yield fact-like truth conditions 
and sentence-like thoughts for them to correspond to, and it is only in this way that 
elements of thought can function as referring expressions and collections of sensory 
states can function as objects of reference. Without all this, there are neither facts nor 
thoughts to correspond to them, and hence no (empirical) truth. Yet the idea that the 
construction of, for example, causal connections and judgments about them can take 
place in time is difficult to make sense of. Fortunately for Kant, having already argued 
for the transcendental ideality of time, the idea that the data of sense are received and 
operated upon by the understanding atemporally in some sense is at least intelligible. 
Unfortunately for Kant, Spir argues quite persuasively that the transcendental ideality of 
time makes little sense itself. 
 
At this juncture, a Neo-Kantian persuaded of the plausibility of both the Kantian account 
of the categories in the Transcendental Deduction and the implausibility of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic (at least as regards time) would appear to have two choices. 
The first choice would be to abandon Kantian epistemology in favor of some form of 
empiricism (though one might continue to regard some naturalized version of Kant's 
cognitive psychology as an empirical hypothesis). Though this option would allow 
Nietzsche to continue to write as if he regarded Kant as possessing some genuine insights 
into the workings of the mind, by strictly speaking abandoning Kant as epistemology, it 
would allow Nietzsche to avoid thorny questions of self-referential incoherence. For if it 
is true that the Transcendental Deduction reveals the necessity of an atemporal 
synthesizing self as a condition of the possibility of true empirical judgments, and 
naturalism is true, so that there cannot be any such self, then it is true that there is no truth. 
The second option is to say that Nietzsche bites this bullet and regards truth, even merely 
empirical truth, as a kind of illusion. If we take this path, judgments of fact will turn out 
to be surprisingly similar to moral judgments as seen by emotivists: their surface 
grammar would misleadingly suggest that they are fact-stating when actually, they are 
merely expressions of attitude, the products of our "drives." 
 
Green embraces this latter alternative, and argues quite convincingly that Nietzsche is 
precisely such a global "noncognitivist." And it is the case that Nietzsche, even very late 
in his authorship, extensively in his unpublished notes but occasionally in his published 
works as well, writes as if there is some sort of deep problem with our truth-claiming 
practices. What is more, most of Nietzsche's discussions of this sort do seem to wear a 
Kantian ancestry on their sleeve, not least in their choice of terminology. Since Nietzsche 
did not, on the whole, publish the notes in which these reflections take place, it may not 
be necessary to choose between these two options as a matter of intellectual history: 
Nietzsche himself may have been quite uncertain about the implications of his 
commitments, and may have been in the process of trying to sort out what to do with 
them when madness descended and he fell silent. However that may be, we are greatly 
indebted to Green for opening a discussion of this long-neglected "transcendental" side to 
Nietzsche's thought. One hopes that this will be but the first of many studies exploring it. 
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